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I. Introduction and Purpose.
Disabled individuals have historically been treated as second-class citizens in the United
States. While improvements have certainly been made over time, disabled individuals still face
significant barriers to enjoying full and equal participation in society. Higher education is one
aspect of American society still lacking proportional representation of the disabled community.
To try and understand why disabled Americans fail to thrive in higher education at rates
approaching those of non-disabled individuals, this paper will examine the following: how the
history of disability discrimination in America influenced passage of powerful antidiscrimination legislation; how American courts have generally interpreted that legislation to the
detriment of Americans with disabilities in higher education, and what is and is not a reasonable
accommodation. This paper will conclude with a summary of statistics pointing to the dearth of
disabled student success in higher education, as well as suggestions of how the American legal
system, and American higher education in general, could be improved to facilitate greater
success for individuals with disabilities.
II. The History of Disability Discrimination
To date, the United States Congress has passed three landmark pieces of legislation
designed to address and minimize disability discrimination: the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments
Act of 2008. While each legislative action has documented America at a particular stage in its
battle to curtail disability discrimination, only the original ADA and the Rehabilitation Act will
be discussed—with the ADA discussed in significantly greater detail—as these acts feature much
more prominently in case law than the ADA Amendments Act, which is rarely if ever identified
distinct from the original act.
Disability Discrimination in Higher Education - 1

A. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
In passing the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, Congress recognized several
important truths about American society. Congress first and foremost recognized that many
people with physical and mental disabilities were precluded from full participation in society due
to disability discrimination. 1 Congress recognized not only that society has historically engaged
in such harmful practices, but also that discrimination on the basis of disability “continue[s] to be
a serious and pervasive social problem. 2 The problem of discrimination on the basis of disability
was identified in almost every aspect of society, including education, employment, and health
services. 3 Disability discrimination was found not only in these various aspects of modern
society, but in a myriad of practices, including “communication barriers, overprotective rules and
policies, failure to make modifications to existing . . . practices, [and] exclusionary qualification
standards and criteria.” 4
Responding to these findings of discrimination, Congress resolved “to invoke the sweep
of congressional authority . . . in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-today by people with disabilities.” 5 Congress sought to “provide clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 6 The
scope of the Americans With Disabilities Act reveals an intent by Congress to cast a broad and
inclusive net across the spectrum of disabilities. For example, Congress could have defined an
individual with a disability simply as a person incapable of any given physical activity. Such a
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42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(1).
42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(2).
3
42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(3).
4
42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(4).
5
42 U.S.C. §12101(b)(4).
6
42 U.S.C. §12101(b)(2).
2

Disability Discrimination in Higher Education - 2

limited definition would have been consistent with the medical model view of disability central
to the Civil War pension system, which “linked the definition of disability to an inability to
work.” 7 Instead, Congress chose to define an individual with a disability as a person with “a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” 8 an
individual who in the past has had “a record of such an impairment,” 9 or a person who has been
judged or “regarded as having such an impairment.” 10
B – Expansive Definition of Disability under the ADA
Expanding the definition of a disabled individual to include those with past and present
mental and physical disabilities provides strong evidence of how pervasive Congress found
disability discrimination to be, and how its modern approach was to differ from the past. Past
conception of disability revolved around the Medical Model of the Civil War pension system,
where “veterans with ‘invisible’ disabilities often were portrayed as scamming the system,
exploiting the public treasury and trust.” 11 As Blanck notes, “[t]here is much that remains from
this period of American history that is relevant today regarding negative conceptions of
disability.” 12 However, instead of clinging to outdated and isolating conceptions of disability,
one major step taken by Congress was to bring so-called “hidden” disabilities—mental
impairments—to the forefront of legitimate disability consideration. Even then, Congress could
have limited applicability of the ADA to only a handful of relatively well-known mental
impairments, such as bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. Instead, Congress accepted the
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definition of mental impairment proffered by the Department of Justice, which includes “[a]ny
mental or psychological disorder such as intellectual disability, organic brain syndrome,
emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disability.” 13 One would be hard pressed to
suggest use of the phrase “any” as indicating a narrow construction of disability, but perhaps
anticipating such an attempt, Congress acted to ensure that “the definition of disability . . . shall
be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals . . . to the maximum extent permitted by
the terms” 14of the ADA.
Beyond an expansive definition of mental impairments, Congress also enabled
application of the legal term disability to a vast range of physical impairments. Broadly defined,
physical impairments include physiological disorders or conditions, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss which affects at least one major body system, such as the neurological,
musculoskeletal, or endocrine system. 15 As one may by now expect, the range of conditions
considered physical impairment for the purpose of ADA disability is quite diverse; the expansive
list includes perhaps predictable impairments like “cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy,
[and] multiple sclerosis,” 16 but also contains potential surprises such as “visual, speech, and
hearing impairments . . . cancer, heart disease, diabetes . . . drug addiction, and alcoholism.” 17
While the sprawling applicability of disability to a vast range of mental and physical
conditions surely evidences congressional intent to protect as many people from shame, scrutiny,
and isolation as possible, another aspect of the definition of disability offers perhaps even
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“Revised Final Title II Rule: A Compilation of Regulatory Provisions and Guidance—Nondiscrimination on the
Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services,” §35.108 (b)(1)(ii), accessed October 11, 2019,
https://www.ada.gov/regs2010/titleII_2010/titleII_2010_regulations.htm
14
42 U.S.C. §12102(4)(A)
15
“ADA Title II Technical Assistance Manual,” II-2.2000, accessed October 12, 2020,
https://www.ada.gov/taman2.html#II-1.2000
16
Id.
17
Id.
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stronger evidence: the list of actions legally considered to be “major life activities.” Defining
major life activity for legal purposes seems another area in which Congress could have taken a
conservative approach and included only activities like working. Instead, Congress declared that
“major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself . . . eating, sleeping,
walking, standing . . . learning, reading, concentrating . . . and working.” 18
Further indicating Congressional intent to offer broad spectrum protection for people
with disabilities are two points within the definition of what “substantially limits” a major life
activity. Faced again with the chance to offer only narrowly-defined and conservative legal
scope to limitations, Congress rather boldly proclaimed an “impairment that is episodic or in
remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.” 19
Further, Congress mandated “[a]n impairment that substantially limits one major life activity
need not limit other major life activities in order to be considered a disability.” 20 Note as well
that “[t]here is no absolute standard for determining when an impairment is a substantial
limitation.” 21
The administrators of the medical model of disability must have been turning in their
graves when Congress opened the gates of disability recognition to mental illness and periodic
impairment.

Perhaps not quite as disturbing to the architects of government-sponsored

disability discrimination, yet still a laudable progressive leap for Congress, was to declare “the
determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made

18
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“ADA Title II Technical Assistance Manual,” II-2.4000, accessed October 13, 2020,
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without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures. . . .” 22 In other words, a
person with a disability—almost without exception—does not risk losing disability protection if
they are able to benefit from the use of “medications for conditions like epilepsy or major
depression, a prosthetic leg, a hearing device, or insulin used to control diabetes.” 23
The most notable exception to the continued protection of disability status despite use of
mitigating measures is that “[t]he ameliorative effects of the mitigating measures of ordinary
eyeglasses or contact lenses shall be considered in determining whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity.” 24 Effectively, this means the “ADA does not apply to
people whose vision is corrected with ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses.” 25 Despite this
exception, it is clear Congress recognized that “individuals with disabilities continually
encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion,” 26 and took
bold action proscribe disability discrimination.
However, I do not mean to suggest that Congress sought to protect absolutely every
behavior or physical condition as a disability. Far from it. In the most practical sense, Congress
applied a modest temporal barrier to disability protection by creating an exception for transitory
impairments, such as broken bones, “with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.” 27
Even here it should be noted that “the issue of whether a temporary impairment is significant

22

42 U.S.C. §12104(4)(E).
Sheryl Ellis. Making It Work: Managing your health condition through ADA workplace accommodations. A
Guide for Employees. P. 96. Augmented HR Solutions. April 18, 2020.
24
42 U.S.C. §12102(4)(E)(ii).
25
Ellis, Making it Work, p. 97.
26
42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(5).
27
42 U.S.C. §12102(3)(B).
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enough to be a disability must be resolved on a case-by-case basis,”

28

where the (expected)

duration of the impairment is balanced against the limitation it actually imposes.
Moving on from temporary injuries, Congress also saw fit to exclude “the color of one’s
eyes, hair, or skin . . . disadvantages attributable to environmental, cultural, or economic factors .
. . [or] common personality traits such as poor judgment or a quick temper, where these are not
symptoms of a mental or psychological disorder.” 29 In other words, disadvantages experienced
due to having red hair, dark skin, or living in an environmental justice community30 do not
qualify an individual for disability protection.
Despite the ADA’s acceptance of science in understanding and protecting as disabled
those with a myriad range of permanent physical and mental impairments, there was a line that
Congress was not willing to cross. That line was extending disability protection to people whose
biological identity is inexplicably confusing and offensive to many Americans. And while it is
admittedly unthinkable to consider a normal biological identity like transgender as a disability in
and of itself, Congress unfortunately bowed to the political will of those offended by when it
excluded “transsexualism . . . [and] gender identity disorders not resulting from physical
impairments” 31 from disability protection despite the crushing weight of social judgment
transgender people often endure. Allowing people the choice to secure disability protection for
gender identity disorders hardly seems reasonable when considering transgender youth

28

“ADA Title II Technical Assistance Manual,” II-2.4000, https://www.ada.gov/taman2.html#II-1.2000, accessed
October 13, 2020.
29
“ADA Title II Technical Assistance Manual,” II-2.2000, accessed October 13, 2020,
https://www.ada.gov/taman2.html#II-2.2000
30
“The Environmental Justice Movement,” accessed October 13, 2020, https://www.nrdc.org/stories/environmentaljustice-movement
31
“ADA Title II Technical Assistance Manual,” II-2.7000, accessed October 13, 2020,
https://www.ada.gov/taman2.html#II-2.7000
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experience nearly four times the risk of depression of their non-transgender peers, 32 and “40
percent of transgender adults have attempted suicide during their lifetime, compared to less than
five percent of the US population as a whole.” 33
Minding that the ADA as a whole is a well-meaning but imperfect means of legal
protection for people with disabilities across the scope of American society, two of the ADA’s
four titles pertain directly to higher education and will be further discussed. Title II pertains to
institutions of higher education operated by public entities, and Title III pertains to similar
institutions operated by private entities.
C. ADA Title II – Public Services (42 U.S.C. §§12131 – 12165)
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act seeks to ensure that “no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in
or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected
to discrimination by any such entity.” 34 While ADA Title II makes no specific reference to any
institution of higher education, it is a logical assumption that such entities are subsumed within
the definition of a “public entity,” which encompasses any state or local government,
department, agency, or other instrumentality. 35 For those who are hesitant to make such
assumptions on legal matters, consider that Title II does not specifically mention state prisons,
either—but an argument to exempt a Pennsylvania state prison from Title II because prisons are
not generally considered benefits or services of a public entity was flatly rejected by Justice

32
Human Rights Campaign Foundation. Mental Health and the LGBTQ Community.
https://suicidepreventionlifeline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/LGBTQ_MentalHealth_OnePager.pdf. Accessed
December 1, 2020.
33
Id.
34
42 U.S.C. §12132.
35
42 U.S.C. §12131 (1)(A) and (B).
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Scalia, who pointed to the “broad language used by Congress and its choice not to include
exceptions.” 36 As such, Title II applies to any college, university, or other institution of higher
education operated by a state or local government, such as a state medical, veterinary, or law
school. The definition of a “qualified individual with a disability” under ADA Title II is much
more direct, and for relevant purposes “means an individual with a disability who, with or
without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices . . . or the provision of auxiliary
aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for . . . participation in programs or
activities provided by a public entity.” 37
D. ADA Title III – Public Accommodations . . . Operated by Private Entities
Generally, Title III of the ADA prohibits discrimination against any individual “on the
basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation. . . .” 38 Unlike Title II of
the ADA, which assumes applicability to public institutions of higher education, Title III makes
explicit reference to the undergraduate and postgraduate private schools to which it applies. 39
Likewise, where Title II provides almost no guidance as to what constitutes discrimination by a
public college or university, Title III articulates several specific forms of discrimination by a
private college or university. Title III’s provision against “failure to make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures . . . unless the entity can demonstrate that
making such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature” 40 of its program seems to be

36

Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 912 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey,
524 U.S. 206 (1998).
37
42 U.S.C. §12131 (2).
38
41 U.S.C. §12182 (a).
39
42 U.S.C. §12181 (7)(J).
40
42 U.S.C. §12182 (b)(2)(A)(ii)
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the most important provision in terms of relevant case law, as will be shown by the discussion of
case law to follow.
III – The Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Before discussing case law pertaining to disability discrimination in higher education, it
is worthwhile to consider how the Americans with Disabilities Act expanded upon the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Most closely linked in time to the medical model of disability and
the greatest intensity of disability discrimination, the Rehabilitation Act was Congress’ first real
acknowledgement that preventing disability discrimination was in the best interest of broader
society. As such, the Rehabilitation Act is laudable for its acknowledgement that “disability is a
natural part of the human experience and in no way diminishes the right of individuals to . . .
enjoy full inclusion and integration in the economic . . . and educational mainstream of American
society.” 41 Likewise, the 1973 Act’s acknowledgement that “a high proportion of students with
disabilities is leaving secondary education without being . . . enrolled in postsecondary
education,” 42 evidences Congress saw disability discrimination in higher education as
detrimental and actionable long before passage of the ADA in 1990.
Recognizing a widespread problem, Congress decided to make the Rehabilitation Act
applicable to “any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 43 Broken down
further, “any program or activity” is defined to include both public systems of higher education
such as colleges and universities, 44 as well as private organizations “principally engaged in the

41

29 U.S.C. §701 (a)(3)(F).
29 U.S.C. §701 (a)(7)(A).
43
29 U.S.C. §794 (a).
44
29 U.S.C. §794 (b)(2)(A).
42
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business of providing education,” 45 giving the Rehabilitation Act equal applicability to higher
education as the ADA.
And yet, despite its commendable recognition of disability discrimination in America,
and the broad scope of its authority, the Rehabilitation Act clearly failed to solve the problem.
Just as subsequent passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act failed to solve the problem of
discrimination on the basis of disability. Of course, it must be noted that both the Rehabilitation
Act and the ADA provided legal framework for dramatic gains in equalizing civil rights for
individuals with disabilities. Additionally, at least in the case of the ADA, Congressional intent
was substantially impaired by consistent judicial conservatism and narrow interpretation of the
Act’s provisions. While this pattern of narrow interpretation ultimately triggered passage of the
ADAAA in 2008, and the law is ostensibly more favorable to individuals with disabilities
pursuing higher education, the following discussion of relevant case law intends to show this aim
has not necessarily become reality.
IV – Case Law pertaining to Disability Discrimination in Higher Education.
When it comes to the case law regarding disability discrimination in higher education,
certain fundamental aspects warrant immediate attention. As a practical matter, at least two of
the federal circuits have adopted the approach of analyzing Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims
together, since the provisions and procedures of both acts are generally equivalent. 46
Since 1991, an institution of higher education has had something of an escape route from
providing accommodation, though the imposition is high: the institution must submit undisputed

45

29 U.S.C. §794 (b)(3)(A)(ii).
Dean v. University. at Buffalo School of Medicine & Biomedical Sciences, 804 F.3d 178, 187 (2nd Cir. 2015) and
Stern v. University of Osteopathic Medicine & Health Services., 220 F.3d 906, 908 (8th Cir. 2000).

46
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facts demonstrating that it considered “alternative means, their feasibility, cost and effect on the
academic program, and came to a rationally justifiable conclusion that the available alternatives
would result either in lowering academic standards or requiring substantial program alteration.” 47
If the institution succeeds in meeting this burden, however, “the court could rule as a matter of
law that the institution had met its duty of seeking reasonable accommodation,” 48 and further
fact finding would only be necessary if there was a genuine dispute of material fact, or there was
“significantly probative evidence of bad faith or pretext.” 49
Absent such an uncontested set of facts, there are additional routes to quick dismissal of
accommodation requests—even when the accommodations might seem “reasonable” to the
outside observer. For example, “[a] publicly funded academic institution is not obligated to
accommodate under the ADA until receiving a proper diagnosis and request for specific
accommodation.” 50 A student requesting accommodation bears the burden of not only
completing a request for accommodation, but proving that they did so. In Buescher v. Baldwin
Wallace University, a student recently admitted to an accelerated nursing program engaged in
email conversations with school officials regarding disability accommodation, but never
completed the formal application for accommodations. The court held there could be no failure
to accommodate since no accommodation request was made. 51 As much as I now seek to
advocate for the disabled individual against the institution—and I do, with great passion
motivated from infuriating personal experience—it is difficult to side against an institution that
did not provide accommodations when its official process was never completed, as was the case

47

Wynne v. Tufts University School of Medicine, 932 F.2d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 1991).
Id.
49
Id.
50
Johnson v. Washington County Career Center, 470 Fed.Appx. 433, 437 (6th Cir. 2012).
51
Buescher v. Baldwin Wallace University, 86 F.Supp. 3d 789, 806 (N.D. Ohio 2015).
48
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when plaintiff Buescher “was given the application for Disability Services . . . and did not
complete it.” 52 However, I can and will find fault with a school—or any institution—that
engages in disability request communications for over three months, including one in which its
own professional disability specialist informs the student that accommodations are simply
unavailable in their program, only to hide behind the fact that the student did not complete a
formal application. 53 Nursing, for example, is hard enough for students without disabilities.
Students with disabilities attempting to participate in such high-demand programs only have
greater difficulty to contend with, and expecting the school to be proactive in helping the student
succeed should not be considered unreasonable.
Pulling Buescher into the discussion of what is and is not a reasonable accommodation,
one could say an accommodation is de facto unreasonable if it is not formally requested.
Similarly, any request for accommodation must be made before failure results from the alleged
disability to be accommodated. In Choi v. University of Texas Health Sciences Center, dental
student Jin Choi was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder during his second year, but did
not inform the school of his disability diagnosis until he had failed one of his clinical courses and
the school had initiated his dismissal from the program. 54 Choi attempted to overcome his
failure to notify the school—a failure he does not contest—by alleging his limitations were open
and obvious to the dental school. 55 Choi supported his claim with several unsubstantiated
allegations, including “three faculty members [who] asked him if he had a learning disability
after he received a failing grade in a third-year course.” 56 The court was not convinced, and

52

Id.
Id.
54
Choi v. University of Texas Health Sci. Ctr. At San Antonio, 663 Fed.Appx. 214, 215 (5th Cir. 2015).
55
Id. at 216.
56
Id.
53
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ultimately affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Choi’s claims because he “alleged
insufficient facts to show that his disability and its consequential limitations were known by the
Dental School.” 57
From the perspective of a law student nearing graduation, I can say that the need to
request legally significant accommodations in advance seems fairly obvious. What I hope to
always remember, and would encourage all in the legal profession to remember, is that nuanced
understanding of practical law is rare. Considering the staggering amount of time people
engaged in higher education programs must dedicate to succeed, it is not unrealistic to accept
how an intelligent person might fail to request their accommodation in advance, or fail to
complete the specific forms, or otherwise leap successfully through the necessary hoops. Clearly
this misunderstanding has no useful benefit in litigation—a plaintiff cannot use the excuse of “I
didn’t know any better” to their advantage—but I find it a helpful consideration nonetheless.
A parallel and equally helpful consideration to retain when considering these and other
unfortunate errors that preclude disabled students from receiving accommodation is the intense
pressure to avoid admitting one has a disability, for fear of that knowledge percolating through
the ranks of one’s peers. In Doe v. Samuel Merritt University, a plaintiff seeking
accommodation to allow unlimited retakes of the American Podiatric Medical Licensing
Examination, Part I—contrary to the school’s established policy, where three failures results in
dismissal 58--took the rare and generally prohibited step of using a fictitious name throughout her
legal proceedings to ensure her disability was not publicly associated with her. 59 The plaintiff
pointed to the fact that podiatry is an extremely close-knit field, with only nine podiatry schools

57

Id.
Doe v. Samuel Merritt University, No. C-13-00007 JSC, 2013 WL 497903 (N.D. Cal. February 8, 2013).
59
Doe v. Samuel Merritt Univ., No. C-13-0000 JSC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59527 (N.D. Cal. April 25, 2013).
58
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in the United States, and that public disclosure of her disability would cause irreparable harm to
her marketability as a candidate for employment. 60 For the reasons plaintiff alleged, and because
no party to the litigation objected to the plaintiff’s desire for anonymity, she was allowed to
proceed under a fictitious name despite this practice running “afoul of the public's common law
right of access to judicial proceedings.” 61Consider the field of veterinary medicine, supplied by
only “32 schools or colleges of veterinary medicine (CVMs) in the U.S. that are accredited or
have accreditation pending.” 62 I believe it would take willful ignorance not to recognize that a
student with a mental or physical limitation might seek to conceal that knowledge as much as
possible, when the field is so close-knit and competitive. The College of Veterinary Medicine at
Colorado State University, for example received 2,284 applications for its class of 2023; that
class consists of 149 students, meaning there were 15.3 applicants for every available seat. 63
Apart from accommodations improperly requested, disability accommodations can also
be denied without judgment of illegal discrimination when the specific accommodation cannot
be shown to be related to the disability. In Stern v. University of Osteopathic Medicine & Health
Services, a student with dyslexia was admitted to medical school and requested an
accommodation that would allow him to “supplement answers on any multiple-choice tests
required, either with an essay or with responses to oral questioning.” 64 The school refused to
provide the requested accommodation, and the student sued under the Rehabilitation Act. 65

60

Id. at *3.
Id. at *1
62
Association of American Veterinary Medical Colleges, FAQs, How many veterinary medical schools are there in
the United States? https://www.aavmc.org/about-aavmc/faqs/#media Accessed December 2, 2020.
63
Association of American Veterinary Medical Colleges, Admitted Student Statistics,
https://www.aavmc.org/becoming-a-veterinarian/what-to-know-before-you-apply/admitted-student-statistics/
accessed December 2, 2020.
64
Stern v. Univ. of Osteopathic Med. & Health Servs., 220 F.3d 906, 907 (8th Cir. 2000).
65
Id.
61
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As is routine in the context of disability discrimination litigation, cases of higher
education disability discrimination follow the burden-shifting framework established under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 in McDonnell-Douglas. 66 Adapted to an academic context, a plaintiffstudent bears the “burden of producing evidence of the existence of a reasonable accommodation
that would enable [the student] to meet the educational institution’s essential eligibility
requirements.” 67 Plaintiff Stern, in the instant case, satisfied this initial burden by demonstrating
his diagnosis of dyslexia and his request for an alternative testing method. 68 Typically, once a
plaintiff has made their initial showing of the existence of a reasonable accommodation, the
burden shifts back to the educational institution, which may rebut the plaintiff’s showing in one
of two ways: by producing evidence that implementation of the requested accommodation would
require substantial—and thus unreasonable—modification of its existing academic program, or
that the requested accommodations, reasonable or not, would not enable the student to meet their
required academic standards. 69 Defendant university here seems to have opted for a third option,
as it did not prove Stern’s proposed accommodation would impose a substantial modification to
its academic program, nor did it show that Stern’s proposed scheme would not enable him to
meet the school’s required standards. Instead, the university explained that it had offered an
alternative accommodation—administration of exams in an oral format, in a separate room, with
extra time—and provided the expert testimony of a psychologist familiar with dyslexia who
believed such accommodation would account for any deficiency attributable to Stern’s
dyslexia. 70 The burden then shifted back to Stern to show why his proposed testing

66

McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
Zukle v.Regents of the Univ. of California, 166 F.3d 1041, 1047 (9th Cir. 1999)
68
Stern at 907.
69
Zukle at 1047.
70
Stern at 908.
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accommodation would benefit him and address his dyslexia in a way that the school’s proposal
would not. Stern could not offer an explanation, and the court concluded he “failed to meet his
burden of showing that the accommodations that he requested were actually related to his
disability.” 71 The court’s underlying concern, and a worthy takeaway from the case, is that an
accommodation failing to specifically address a particular individual’s disability condition—
instead simply making an essential requirement like testing easier for any person who might
receive it—will not be considered a reasonable accommodation.
Stern does not elaborate on why the plaintiff failed to explain how his proposed testing
accommodation, of allowing supplementary written answers, would enable him to overcome his
dyslexia and succeed in the medical school program. It is, of course, possible that he was faking
the whole thing; that he never had dyslexia, and simply wanted easier testing. However, I find it
highly unlikely a person would go to the trouble of faking a disability and requesting an
accommodation if they had the grades—as plaintiff Stern did—to get into the program in the first
place. It is unfortunate, in my mind, that one expert was able to torpedo Stern’s request for
accommodation because in his one opinion, dyslexia could be otherwise accommodated. He is,
after all, only one expert, and the human brain is an impossibly complex organ. I do not find it
unreasonable to believe Stern knew something that would help him that one expert did not
understand. Plus, as I imagine most any professor can attest, granting a student the ability to
write additional words in answer to an exam question in no way guarantees the student will get
the right answer. If Stern did not know the material, he would have failed regardless of how he
was allowed to deliver the answer.

71

Id. at 909.
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Beyond accommodations that are not in fact requested, and those that are not shown to be
specifically related to a disability, accommodations may also be considered unreasonable and
denied—or a discrimination lawsuit alleging denial of accommodations dismissed--if the
accommodation requests are not sufficiently articulated. Echoing the back-and-forth
communication breakdown of Buechler, a student who “vaguely asserts that he sent numerous
letters and made phone calls to University officials . . . requesting accommodations” 72 is highly
unlikely to prove that disability discrimination is the reason he did not receive the
accommodations. Specificity is essential not only to prove that accommodations were in fact
requested, but also that the requests themselves provided a basis “for evaluating whether each
request was adequately communicated to the University regarding a specific course or whether
each was necessary to enable him to participate in a particular course in light of his disability.” 73
Additionally, “in the higher education context, a plaintiff alleging failure to accommodate under
Title III or the Rehabilitation Act must show (1) that the plaintiff is disabled and otherwise
qualified academically.” 74 A student who never completed his graduate school application,
lacked sufficient preparation for graduate coursework as would be obtained at the undergraduate
level, and generally exhibited academic performance below the standard necessary for admission
to a graduate program is almost certain to be denied admission on grounds of not being otherwise
qualified. 75 In the extremely unfortunate event that each of these faults apply to a single student,
as they did to Appellant Mershon, that student is all but guaranteed to lose a lawsuit alleging
disability discrimination for failure to accommodate.
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In a more poignant scenario—and if I’m not mistaken, the Supreme Court’s first
Rehabilitation Act case—the Court held that “[n]othing in the language or history of §504
reflects an intention to limit the freedom of an educational institution to require reasonable
physical qualifications for admission to a clinical training program.” 76 In that case, Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, the physical qualification required was the ability to hear and
process spoken words, as the applicant in question suffered from a severe hearing disability, 77
and could only “be responsible for speech spoken to her [] when the talker gets her attention and
allows her to look directly at the talker.” 78 In other words, the applicant seeking training as a
registered nurse could only process speech sufficiently for action when she was lipreading. The
Respondent contended, among other things, that she could be given individual supervision by
faculty members whenever providing direct attention to a patient, and that she needed to be
trained only in some of the tasks a registered nurse is licensed to perform. 79 Unconvinced by the
Respondent-applicant’s proposals, the Court found that the college, “with prudence, could allow
her to take only academic classes. . . . [where] she would not receive even a rough equivalent of
the training a nursing program normally gives. Such a fundamental alteration in the nature of a
program is far more than the ‘modification’ the regulation requires.” 80
From Southeastern, one could take away the lesson that any accommodation which
completely changes the student experience and by necessity limits the prospective student’s
potential benefit shall be considered unreasonable.
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If Southeastern left any doubt, a much more recent request for accommodation solidifies
the notion that institutions of higher education are allowed to impose basic physical
qualifications for admission to clinical programs, and that the use of a surrogate to perform tasks
the applicant cannot perform is not a reasonable accommodation. A woman diagnosed with
spinal muscular atrophy, Type III, was denied admission into a medical school program based on
her inability to meet the school’s Motor Technical Standards, which were deemed “an essential
requirement for participation in a medical education. . . .” 81 The plaintiff-student had requested
“the appointment of a staff aide or surrogate to perform the physical, motor movements which
the plaintiff could not perform for herself” 82 on account of “the extreme weakness in her arms
and legs . . . limiting her lifting to only 10 to 20 pounds.” 83 The court found that this reduced
capacity “would reduce the plaintiff to the role of an observer rather than that of a medical
student clinician.” 84 More directly, the court held that [s]substitution of a surrogate would force
a fundamental change in the School’s curriculum,” 85 constituting an unreasonable
accommodation. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, summary judgment against McCulley was
affirmed. 86 In affirming summary judgment against her, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
made note of a point that is important, if for no other reason than to show sympathy with the
plaintiff: “[a]lthough McCulley does not intend to pursue a physically demanding specialty, she
must nevertheless meet” 87 her school’s Motor Technical Standards because they are the
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standards required by the school, and the ADA does not give courts authority “to make sweeping
revisions to the content of medical school curricula.” 88
At times, as in Southeastern and McCulley, sympathetic plaintiffs allege disability
discrimination in situations where it clearly exists, but the applicable legal framework combines
with a stubborn institution clinging to the past to deny any form of relief. In an instance falling
outside that type of scenario, an engineering undergraduate at the University of California Los
Angeles (“UCLA”) recently and rather boldly moved for a mandatory preliminary injunction
against UCLA for denial of reasonable testing accommodations. 89 Here, Plaintiff alleged she
suffers from the disability condition of chronic migraines which, having a tendency to suddenly
peak in severity, substantially impair her ability to take the timed written exams prevalent in her
program. 90 Despite her acknowledgment that UCLA provided other accommodations, such as
“extended time on exams, a reduced-distraction environment, [and] the opportunity to retake
missed exams,” 91 Plaintiff claims Defendant had failed to provide reasonable accommodation
because the accommodations it had already provided were ineffective. Plaintiff’s desired relief
was really two sides of the same coin: she sought an injunction which would prohibit UCLA
from categorically denying her alternative forms of academic evaluation—such as term projects
and oral exams instead of timed written exams—while simultaneously requiring UCLA to
provide her these alternative forms of evaluation. 92
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In this case, the plaintiff faced two significant barriers to success: well-warranted judicial
hesitancy regarding mandatory preliminary injunctions, where “courts should be extremely
cautious,” 93 and judicial deference. “The Supreme Court has instructed that courts ‘should show
great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment.’” 94 “While the [Ewing] Court made this
statement in the context of a due process violation claim, a majority of circuits have extended
judicial deference to an educational institution’s academic decisions in ADA and Rehabilitation
Act cases.” 95 In Zukle, the Ninth Circuit joined the First, Second, and Fifth Circuits in applying
the Ewing standard so far as to “extend judicial deference ‘to the evaluation made by the
institution itself, absent proof that its standards and its application of them serve no purpose other
than to deny an education to handicapped persons.’” 96
Against this standard of deference—Plaintiff Sung-Miller, and many other plaintiffs
seeking arguably more reasonable accommodation—face long odds and little hope of success.
Were the attitudes of all educators not so firmly entrenched, and there was greater willingness
among educators to embrace alternative means of testing when appropriate, I might be able to
consider judicial deference to academia in a more positive light. After all, “the design of proper
academic tests . . . is not itself a science, but, rather, is a judgmental matter in respect to which
teachers . . . are far more expert than judges and juries.” 97 I support judicial deference to
administrative agency expert knowledge in environmental regulatory matters, and that deference
exists for exactly the same reason as does deference to professors and universities. Perhaps my
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view is hypocritical. Perhaps the law is flexible and broad enough to allow for such
contradictory views.
Regardless, Sung-Miller needed to overcome judicial deference to UCLA and convince
the court that “the plain differences between some of the alternatives [she] propose[d] (term
papers, projects, oral exams) and sit-down exams” were a reasonable accommodation. 98 This did
not happen, and plaintiff’s motion for a mandatory preliminary injunction was denied. 99
As much as I sympathize with the plaintiffs in McCulley and Southeastern, and as much
as Sung-Miller’s ambitious reach for a mandatory preliminary injunction irks me, I find it truly
sad that a request for alternative testing methods like this was deemed unreasonable—or at least
that a student with the grades to prove herself otherwise qualified could not be granted this
accommodation. I cannot deny that here, as in Stern, it seems possible to believe Sung-Miller
was faking it. I just don’t believe that, and don’t see the harm in providing a more suitable
means of eliciting knowledge from a student—or at least, giving that student a better chance to
prove they possess the desired knowledge. This case does not leave me fond of judicial
deference.
Which makes the next case a welcome change, as it presents a rare glimpse into what it
takes for an educational institution to see its judicial deference evaporate. In a 1999 case, the
Ninth Circuit advised that courts may refuse to defer if an institution fails to follow the
guidelines set forth in Wynne regarding a submission of uncontested facts detailing the
institution’s thorough investigation of accommodation possibilities. 100 Deference will most
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likely not be extended if the requisite factual record is replaced by the head of an institution
proffering “simple conclusory averment,” 101 of the institution’s efforts. Such was the case when
the Dean of the School of Medicine at the University of California at Davis denied a student’s
request for ongoing accommodation without being able to present the court with a factual record
showing without question that he had investigated the proposed accommodation and its potential
impact on the school, or alerting the student to the potential of rejection, or notifying any
university personnel who could before rejecting it, or in truth taking any evaluative action
whatsoever before denying the accommodation request. 102
It is important to note that the judicial refusal to defer does not automatically indicate a
requested accommodation is reasonable. On this note, the Wong court noted that it was not—at
this stage, anyway—holding Wong’s requested accommodation was reasonable; only that a jury
could decide it was reasonable, allowing him to survive a motion for summary judgment against
him. 103 A similar case in which a Defendant university also failed to submit any evidence, let
alone uncontested facts, documenting its thorough efforts to evaluate the reasonableness of a
requested scheduling accommodation led to a grant of summary judgment being set aside on
appeal. 104 Such an action gives surprising teeth to the claim in Wynne that “there is a real
obligation on the academic institution to seek suitable means of reasonably accommodating a
handicapped person and to submit a factual record indicating that it conscientiously carried out
this statutory obligation.” 105
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In addition to offering an example of deference lost, Wong also points out—through a
somewhat twisted path—that reasonableness of accommodation “depends on the individual
circumstances of each case, [and] this determination requires a fact-specific, individualized
analysis of the disabled individual’s circumstances and the accommodations that might allow
him to meet the program’s standards.” 106 Put another way, an accommodation offered in exactly
the same format might be reasonable for one student, and unreasonable for another, based on
their own unique circumstances. In Wong, the Defendant University of California at Davis
Medical School asserted that Plaintiff Wong was not otherwise qualified for its program even
with reasonable accommodation. 107
In challenging the reasonableness of Wong’s accommodation, and his qualification as a
student, the University pursued three distinct arguments. The first is one I cannot help but
consider to be a detestable legal strategy—I call it the “success is failure” strategy—where the
University argued Wong did not need the accommodation because he had “passed the Pediatrics
clerkship the first time he took it . . . without any accommodation.” 108 Further agitation stems
from the University’s argument that Wong—who was apparently too successful to require
accommodation—had simultaneously demonstrated, by virtue of how much time he had taken to
complete his third year, that he was unable to ever meet the school’s required academic
standards. 109 Additionally, the University contended Wong’s accommodation of eight weeks of
“additional reading time [] would not have improved the ‘hands-on’ skills with which he had so
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much difficulty,” although “Wong’s performance in the 1994 and 1995 Surgery clerkships []
tend to disprove the University’s assertion. . . .” 110
Admittedly, the fact that Wong had spent nearly four years working on completion of his
third-year curriculum 111 does not inspire great confidence. However, Wong’s timeline worthy of
deeper examination, as it was interspersed with several complicating events likely to exact a
significant toll on anyone. Shortly after Wong failed his first clinical clerkship in the Summer of
1991—the first sign of Wong’s academic struggles—his father was diagnosed with lung cancer,
and Wong accordingly took time off in March 1992. 112 Wong returned to school in July of 1992,
receiving generally positive feedback and passing grades, though some of his evaluators noticed
he was having organizational and communicational difficulties. 113 Wong’s father died three
weeks after he reenrolled in the Medicine clerkship that he had failed at the beginning of his
third year, and this devastated Wong. 114 Only after failing the Medicine clerkship a second time
in the summer of 1993—two years after his academic difficulty began—was Wong referred for
testing at the University’s Disability Resource Center, where it was discovered he had an
unnamed information processing and self-expression disability. 115 While working with a school
psychologist to develop academic strategies, the school promised—but failed—to appoint Wong
both a Student Learning Disability Advisor and a disability resource team. 116
Fortunately, I believe, the court found that no argument the University pursued was
“sufficient to overcome . . . the evidence Wong presented that when given extra time to read
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between clerkships, he could meet the academic standards of the School of Medicine.” 117 It is
frustrating to consider, however, that the resolution in this case was not a decision that Wong’s
accommodation was reasonable and that he was qualified with reasonable accommodation. For
all the improvement Wong had shown in his grades after receiving accommodation, despite his
father’s illness and death, and despite the seemingly arbitrary decision by the university to
spontaneously deny Wong’s accommodation, his academic fate was still in jeopardy. All of this
struggle only allowed Wong to fight another day, and while that is better than other possible
outcomes, I believe disabled students already have to fight hard enough to succeed. I discussed
this case in depth because I believe it demonstrates the significant and unfortunate barriers that
courts, obligated by current law, place between disabled students and success in higher
education.
Another case decided shortly before Wong, concerning a student at the same medical
school—the University of California at Davis—serves to remind us that “reasonableness is not a
constant. To the contrary, what is reasonable in a particular situation may not be reasonable in a
different situation – even if the situational differences are relatively slight.” 118 In this case,
plaintiff Zukle, like Wong, was diagnosed with a reading comprehension learning disability well
after admission to the medical school. 119 Unlike Wong, however, Zukle experienced academic
difficulty almost immediately and received eight “Y” grades (a provisional failing grade eligible
to be remedied upon repeat performance of an exam or clerkship 120) in the pre-clinical years of
her program. 121 The University dismissed Zukle for demonstrating a consistent incapacity to
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develop the skills required of a physician on January 17, 1995, and unanimously decided to
sustain the dismissal after Zukle’s appeal that June. 122 After her dismissal, “Zukle sought eight
weeks off before each clerkship to read the assigned text for that clerkship in its entirety.” 123
Eight weeks off to complete reading assignments before each clerkship is exactly the
same accommodation as Plaintiff Wong would receive from the same school at roughly the same
time. Unlike Wong, however, where the plaintiff demonstrated significant academic and clinical
improvement with accommodation, Zukle did not. Despite being offered all of the
accommodations typically provided to students with learning disabilities—including double time
on exams and a decelerated schedule—Zukle continued to receive “Y” grades. 124 Additionally,
Zukle requested a specific accommodation to rearrange her clerkship schedule to accommodate
studying for the United States Medical Licensing Exam, Step 1 (“USMLE”) which, if granted,
would temporarily have left her with two incomplete clerkships. 125
The University “presented evidence that granting this request would require a substantial
modification of its curriculum.” 126 The court recognized—as Zukle herself admitted—that “no
student had been allowed to rearrange her clerkships in the manner Zukle requested” . . . and the
court thus had “little difficulty concluding that this would be a substantial alteration of the
Medical School's curriculum.” 127 As well, the court recognized that “simply because the
Medical School had granted other students requests to proceed on a decelerated schedule, does
not mean that Zukle’s request was reasonable.” 128 The court ultimately concluded that allowing
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Zukle “to remain in Medical School on a decelerated schedule would have lowered the Medical
School’s academic standards, which it was not required to do to accommodate Zukle.” 129
Accordingly, the court dismissed Zukle’s claim for failure to establish disability discrimination
under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. 130
Perhaps anticlimactically, my final case for discussion is hardly a landmark case, and it
holds no precedent outside the 10th Circuit. However, no case discovered during my research
for this paper triggered greater anger than this one, and rationally or not, the injustice present in
the majority of these cases make me angry. That said, in Cunningham v. University of New
Mexico Board of Regents, plaintiff Cunningham was diagnosed with Irlen Syndrome during a
medical leave of absence from his first year of medical school. 131 Among other symptoms, Irlen
Syndrome causes bright and fluorescent light sensitivity, poor reading comprehension, eye strain,
and migraines. 132 Cunningham was denied (an unspecified) request for accommodation from the
University of New Mexico (“UNM”) when he returned to school in 2007, though he managed to
complete the first two years of his program by mitigating the effects of Irlen Syndrome with
prescription colored glasses and medicines. 133 Cunningham took his first attempt at the USMLE
Step 1 that same year, but “[t]he bright, fluorescent lighting in the small Step 1 testing room
caused Mr. Cunningham’s severe headaches to flare up and resulted in him having difficulty
reading and concentrating on the test materials. He failed by a narrow margin.” 134
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Cunningham then applied to take the USMLE a second time, and concurrently applied for
accommodation from the New Mexico Board of Medical Examiners (the “Board”), the entity
responsible for administration of the USMLE. 135 Despite Cunningham’s submission of
documentation from a physician and clinical psychologist explaining his diagnosis and need for
accommodation, the Board denied Cunningham’s accommodation request and, in its denial,
“cited the complete lack of evidence of any formal accommodations in Mr. Cunningham’s
past.” 136 There is a true cruelty found in the Board’s denial of accommodation to a disabled
individual who had no evidence of a formal accommodation for disability because the only
institution at which he had ever needed accommodation also denied his request. The injury is all
the more severe as Cunningham had also “requested the assistance of the UNM Disability
Committee in obtaining the desired accommodation from the Board. 137
In denying this request, I can only assume the Board did not understand Cunningham’s
diagnosis to be a new manifestation, one that could not be supported by past history, as
evidenced by the Board’s request for “‘extensive and voluminous’ records” of Cunningham’s
disability history. 138 Without submitting the records requested by the board—almost assuredly
because such records did not exist—Plaintiff Cunningham took the MLE without
accommodation a second time, and failed by a margin similarly narrow to his first attempt. 139
Plaintiff Cunningham subsequently filed disability discrimination claims under the ADA,
Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. §1983—all of which were dismissed by the district court. 140 I
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am appalled by the district court holding that Cunningham “was not disabled because, inter alia,
he was able to mitigate the impairment brought on by his Irlen Syndrome.” 141
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit seized on the jurisdictional issues of the case. Focusing on
ripeness, the court considered the fact that Cunningham’s complaint was filed after his second
failed attempt at the USMLE—when a student has three such attempts prior to expulsion—as
depriving the Board of rendering a final judgment that could in fact be ripe for adjudication. 142
Admittedly, the Tenth Circuit was on legally solid—yet morally detestable—footing when it
ignored the merits of Cunningham’s claim due to ripeness issues.
And yet, the appellate court was not finished skewering Mr. Cunningham. Though it
declined to rule on the merits of Cunningham’s case, the court did see fit to comment on them.
In unique social parlance by which I am enraptured, the court ran headfirst into the biggest issue
of the case without the slightest hint of recognition it had done so. Summarizing a very longwinded dismissal of Cunningham’s case, the court decided that UNM could not be held liable for
its refusal to provide accommodations to Cunningham, because “Mr. Cunningham demonstrated
that he did not need an accommodation to pass his medical school classes or tests.” 143 This to me
is a prime example of the “success is failure” phenomenon, where Cunningham’s perseverance
and self-sufficiency in seeking mitigation measures—as well, likely, as intense studying—both
enabled him to succeed in the absence of accommodation, and also cost him the accommodation
he clearly needed.
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The court continued its foray into my contempt when it decided that even if UNM had
provided Cunningham’s requested accommodations, such action could not have aided
Cunningham obtain accommodation from the Board for the USMLE—due to the Board’s
independent judgment and administration of the exam—even though the primary reason the
Board denied Cunningham accommodation was that he lacked sufficient documentation of his
disability and related struggles, documentation he would have had if UNM had granted his
accommodation request. 144 In contemplating this case, I cannot help but see the worst version of
the ouroboros our legal system has to offer.
V. Statistics
The following statistics are all sourced from United States Census Bureau data from
2015, 145 and are intended to help illustrate the dearth of disabled students in higher education.
Based on a total sample size of 212,132 people, 12% of Americans aged 25 and older had earned
an advanced degree—here defined as anything above a Bachelor’s degree—by 2015. The
statistics show that having a disability is one of the greatest demographic barriers to success in
higher education, as only 5.7% of individuals with a disability also had an advanced degree. For
comparison, 12% of both men and women held advanced degrees. The greatest difference in
advance degree attainment by age was found between two age groups I would not have guessed:
only 10.9% of Americans aged 25 to 34 reported having an advanced degree, compared to 13.8%
of Americans aged 35 to 44. That difference—2.9%—falls well short of the disparity where
advanced degree attainment is 7.2% higher among the non-disabled population of all Americans.
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Only a very limited number of racial demographic factors exceed that disparity. For example,
only 4.7% of Hispanic respondents reported having an advanced degree, compared to 21.4% of
Asian respondents.
VI. Solutions
First and foremost, I believe judicial deference to academic institutions needs to be
restrained, and the burden of proof on students with disabilities must be reduced. In reading
these cases, academic standards seem less like worthy goals of education and more like a grab
bag of excuses that can be used to shake loose challenging students.
Another method of increasing representation and success of disabled individuals in the
realm of higher education is through raising the awareness and opening the minds of established
professionals to the plight of disabled students. The Association of American Veterinary
Medical Colleges’ (“AAVMC”) Annual Data Report of 2019-2020, a 63 page document
dedicated to analyzing the diversity of the incoming and first year veterinary medical classes in
the United States, does not mention disabled students once. 146 Similarly, organizers called a
regional meeting of the American Veterinary Medical Association (“AVMA”), focusing on
diversity and inclusion in veterinary academia, “the first major conference to focus on disability
and accessibility in veterinary medicine.” 147 That was just in 2016. At that conference, Dr. Beth
Sabin, associate director for international and diversity initiatives for the AVMA, advised that
“[w]ith some thought, conversation, and minimal effort, [veterinary] practice owners can
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implement changes to better accommodate disabled individuals, whether those individuals are
working for them or they are clients. . . it’s not about making things easier for some, it’s about
providing opportunities for all.” 148 Dr. Willie M. Reed, dean of the College of Veterinary
Medicine at Purdue University, addressed the need for “a culture of inclusion, and more people
willing to advance the cause. The profession needs to reflect the population. Our profession will
become irrelevant if we don’t change with the world.” 149
The more we are able to free professionals from the “I did it this way, so you do it this
way” mindset, the easier it will be to devise and implement modern curricula more likely to
facilitate the success of disabled individuals. Melinda Frye, DVM, PhD, associate dean of
veterinary academic and student affairs at Colorado State University (CSU), advocates for
abandoning some of the rigid ideas about what a veterinary student must do to demonstrate
competency. 150 Lisa Greenhill, senior director for institutional research and diversity at the
AAVMC, conveys that “[n]early 12% of Doctor of Veterinary Medicine (DVM) students selfidentify as having some type of disability,” 151 and sees a shift in attitude recognizing that “maybe
the veterinary student doesn’t have to do everything. . . . We have seen a shift in schools that
emphasize how to better use the team versus the individual.” 152
One very simple way that more disabled students could succeed in veterinary medicine
would be to endorse limited licensure—to allow students to be licensed to practice only small or
large animal medicine. Students with physical disabilities could still become wonderful
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veterinarians and work with dogs and cats in shelters, or provide needed care for the rabbits and
hamsters that young children adore. There is no sense in requiring students who—by reason of
their disability, if not personal preference—will be forever unable to work with large animals
professionally to demonstrate their skill in performing rectal examinations on dairy cattle, or
lameness analysis in horses. And yet, it would seem the “you have to do it this way because I
did it this way,” mentality remains entrenched, and limited licensure is not a legal option
anywhere in the United States as yet. Yet even the North American Veterinary Medical
Education Consortium (“NAVMEC”) recognizes that veterinary medical “graduates typically
focus on one or a few species or a discipline (e.g. public health).” 153 Why force an unnecessarily
broad education on a student who cannot physically benefit from it, when even the most ablebodied students do not generally practice so broadly?
I believe the limited licensure concept could be successfully applied in other fields
requiring higher education degrees, to the benefit of individuals with disabilities as well as the
public at large. In the field of law, for example, several states have begun to experiment with
limited licensure programs. “In 2018, Utah approved a new class of legal professionals called
licensed paralegal practitioners (LLPs), making it the second state behind Washington to take
such action. LLPs are permitted to help litigants in a wide variety of cases, including separation,
divorce, name changing, and custody and support.” 154 And while the Washington State Bar
Association’s concerns over the cost and lack of interest in the program resulted in a vote to
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sunset the program by the Washington State Supreme Court, 155 Barbara Madsen—that court’s
former chief justice—penned a scathing dissent and noted that “the cost of growing and
maintaining this group of licensed professionals is less than 1 percent of the Association’s
budget.” 156 Supporters of LLLT and similar programs claim “the opposition stemmed from
lawyers who feared ‘that their market share [would] be eroded’ by nonlawyer technicians’ . . .
‘even while lawyers are suffering underemployment and massive student debt.’” 157 While
concerns over unemployment in unstable markets—whether before or during the Covid-19
pandemic—are certainly sympathetic fears, they tend to miss one very substantial point:
programs such as the LLLT have been designed, at least in part, to provide greater access to
justice than America currently achieves. According to a study by the Legal Services
Corporation, [l]ow-income Americans receive inadequate or no professional legal help for 86%
of the civil legal problems they face in a given year.” 158 This would seem to be a substantial
market for more cost-effective and narrowly tailored legal services—that will never be within
reach of fully licensed lawyers, and thus liable for eroding their market share—and those
services could be provided by LLLTs. Such narrowed, shorter-term programs may more
appealing alternatives for individuals with and without disabilities who would prefer the shorter
curriculum.

155

American Bar Association. How the Washington Supreme Court’s LLLT program met it’s demise.
https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/how-washingtons-limited-license-legal-technician-program-met-its-demise.
Accessed December 4, 2020.
156
Supreme Court of the State of Washington. Barbara Madsen’s Dissent to Sunset of LLLT, at 3. June 5, 2020.
https://www.abajournal.com/files/Madsen_dissent_6-5-20.pdf. Accessed December 4, 2020.
157
American Bar Association. How the Washington Supreme Court’s LLLT program met its demise.
https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/how-washingtons-limited-license-legal-technician-program-met-its-demise.
Accessed December 4, 2020.
158
Legal Services Corporation. The Justice Gap: Measuring the Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-income
Americans. June 2017. Page 30. https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf
accessed December 4, 2020.

Disability Discrimination in Higher Education - 36

Limited licensure in the medical field already exists to some extent, and for surprisingly
cost-effective reasons: “[y]ou wouldn’t expect a heart surgeon to be the person taking your
blood sample, nor would it be reasonable to pay that person’s rate to do so. Why should it be
any different with legal services?” 159 As well, limited licensure could easily be expanded in the
medical field: not every medical student necessarily wants to be an emergency room physician,
subject to the physical demands ingrained in school standards. Especially in the era of covid-19,
the need for infectious disease and other forms of medical researchers is likely to grow. Why
limit the number of people qualified to do that research by imposing irrelevant physical strength
requirements needed for work they would never do?
Another way to potentially shift attitudes and increase representation and success of
disabled students in higher education is simply through additional lawsuits. Provision of
substantial additional funding to the Legal Services Corporation could significantly increase its
resources to fund lawsuits from those otherwise unable to afford legal redress, which includes I
sincerely believe a surge in disability litigation could encourage more schools to accept that
allowing a student like “Zukle to remain in Medical School on a decelerated schedule would
[NOT] have lowered the Medical School’s academic standards.” 160 In a dream world, such
schools would even see the challenge of elevating more students like Zukle up to their precious
standards as a significant source of pride, rather than an intolerable drain of resources.
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VII. Conclusion.
We do not live in a dream world. We live in a harsh world where the law is frequently
lagging behind social expectations. We live in a world where students with disabilities are still
often treated as getting a leg up with accommodations that really only level the playing field.
We live in a world where schools and employers see disabled applicants as liabilities, not people.
As the son and grandson of wonderful teachers, I have tremendous respect for
professional educators at all levels. I recognize how hard educators work, and how high their
burden is to produce successful students. I also recognize that, at least in several of the cases
discussed—notably Wong and Zukle—the Defendant University undeniably made prolonged
efforts to accommodate the student-plaintiffs. I recognize that educational institutions have
finite financial and personnel resources available, and in many cases simply must triage the
students whose chances of success seem like too much of a drain on those resources. I recognize
that a decision to dismiss a student for failure to demonstrate successful academic performance
does not automatically equate to a personal attack on that student, no matter how much that
might feel like the truth. Just as judges must frequently decide cases simply on facts and law that
strongly contrast their personal opinions, so too must academic institutions dismiss students they
would retain in an ideal world.
Implementing any of the changes I have suggested—whether limited licensure or reduced
deference--will take time and significant cultural shift, both within the legal field and in the
professions discussed. Change is likely to be slow, but civil rights in America have never seen
rapid adoption for any group. So long as avenues to pursue and accelerate change exist,
however, change will occur. I hope my discussion will help advance change in some small way.
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